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Abstract—Mobile edge computing (MEC) is an emerging
paradigm where users offload computationally intensive jobs
to the Access Point (AP). Given that the AP’s resources are
shared by selfish mobile users, pricing is a useful tool for
incentivising users to internalize the negative externality of delay
they cause to other users. Different users have different negative
valuations towards delay as some are more delay sensitive. To
serve heterogeneous users, we propose a priority pricing scheme
where users can get served first for a higher price. Our goal is
to find the prices such that in decision making, users will choose
the class and the offloading frequency that jointly maximize
social welfare. With the assumption that the AP knows users’
profit functions, we derive in semi-closed form the optimal prices.
However in practice, the reporting of users’s profit information
incurs a large signalling overhead. Besides, in reality users might
falsely report their private profit information. To overcome this,
we further propose learning-based pricing mechanisms where
no knowledge of individual user profit functions is required.
At equilibrium, the optimal prices and average edge delays are
learnt, and users have chosen the correct priority class and
offload at the socially optimal frequency.
Index Terms—Mobile edge computing, multi-user offloading,
differentiated services, priority pricing, decentralized mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent advancements of technology, mobile devices
now run novel and diverse applications such as mobile games,
facial recognition, augmented and virtual reality. These appli-
cations are computationally intensive and energy consuming.
With respect to meeting these requirements, the computational
capabilities and battery power of mobile devices, while im-
proving over the past years, are still relatively insufficient [1].
To deal with this insufficiency, computationally intensive jobs
are typically offloaded to cloud servers via access points (e.g.,
base station or Wi-Fi), helping to prolong battery life and
improve user experience. However, jobs involving augmented
reality, human computer interaction and autonomous driving
also carry stringent low latency requirements. With cloud
computing, it is difficult to meet these requirements, as the
huge distance between the cloud and the users results in users
experiencing wide area network (WAN) delay [2].
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In order to meet stringent low latency requirements, the
trend of edge computing is occurring [3]–[5], wherein job
computation or data storage will be shifted to the network
edge, instead of the faraway cloud. In this way, WAN delay is
avoided. At the same time, the edge has better computational
capabilities in comparison to mobile devices in handling the
computationally intensive jobs. In cellular networks, this kind
of computing refers to Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), and
the network edge refers to the access point (AP), i.e., the base
stations. As the AP is also in control of the wireless channels,
edge computing enables a joint scheduling optimization of
edge computing and radio resources. This enhances the system
wide resource allocation efficiency.
Currently, there is substantial interest in investigating the
joint optimization of radio and computing resource in MEC.
For example, [6]–[9] study the single user scenario. The
works [10]–[13] investigate the multi user scenario, while [14]
investigated the multiple AP scenario. The D2D case with
mutual sharing of resources among users is considered in
[15], and the scenario with energy harvesting is investigated
in [16], [17]. In these works, resource allocation is given a
centralized optimization formulation, in particular as a Mixed
Integer Nonlinear Programming (MINP) problem. However,
for centralized optimization to be implemented, the AP must
be able to control users’ offloading amount or frequency.
Secondly, the AP must have knowledge of users’ offloading
profit functions. In reality, the AP is not able to control the
amount offloaded by users and the users’ offloading profit
functions are unobservable to the AP. Besides, users are
unwilling to report information like profit functions, because
these encapsulate private information such as distance from
the AP and battery states.
Another line of research takes queueing delay into con-
sideration [18]–[23], since as compared to the cloud, the
network edge usually has limited computational resource,
and tasks might need to wait in a queue before they are
executed. Specifically, the works [18]–[21] proposed dynamic
offloading algorithms based on Lyapunov optimization, effec-
tively incorporating the long-term average cost minimization
problem into real-time optimizations. The first two works
study the single user scenario with a user running various
types of tasks; the works [20], [21] further investigate the
multiple users scenario with users moving erratically or un-
der a probabilistic constraint on the queue length violations.
However, these Lyapunov-based algorithms require knowledge
of queueing states, channel conditions, etc., which the AP
has to periodically measure. As such, implementing these
2algorithms will incur a large signalling overhead. On the other
hand, the works [22], [23] take average delay of queueing
as the performance metric. In specific, the work [22] applies
the theories of stochastic geometry and parallel computing
to derive the scaling laws of communication/computation la-
tency with respect to network-load parameters. The work [23]
considers concurrent traditional uplink/downlink transmissions
and MEC-based tasks, differentiating tasks with quality of
service (QoS) requirements and assigning higher priorities to
those tasks with lower latency requirements. To the best of the
authors’ knowledge, few works use priority (in a queue) as a
mechanism to optimally allocate radio and compute resources
in MEC.
Priority is an important consideration in optimizing resource
scheduling, since users and jobs are not homogeneous, and
different users have different costs or negative valuations to-
wards waiting time [24]. For example, an application involving
human computer interaction or virtual reality is more delay
sensitive compared to a text messaging or even an internet
browsing application, as the first two involve interaction and
real time feedback [18], [21]. Providing a priority option
allows users and jobs with higher waiting costs to get served
first, after paying an additional fee. In contrast, providing only
one service class will incur welfare loss for users with higher
waiting costs. Many service industries for example telcos, the
postal service and theme parks all offer a priority option. The
priority mechanism increases the service provider or operator’s
revenue, while allocating resources in a way to maximize the
overall welfare of heterogeneous users. With this in mind, we
aim to approach resource optimization in MEC via a priority
mechanism, in which priority is treated as a valuable resource.
A. Related works and main contributions of this paper
In this work, we aim to optimize resource allocation for
MEC in a distributed manner, given that centralized optimiza-
tion requires control and perfect information which the AP
does not have. Other works taking this distributed approach
include: in [25] the initial centralized MINP problem is broken
down into sub-problems and dealt with semi-distributively.
[26]–[30] reformulate the centralized problem into a game and
derive the Nash Equilibrium. This equilibrium is inefficient,
with the welfare loss arising because in decision making,
selfish users did not internalize the negative externalities of
congestion and delay they cause to the system. In light
of this and because the AP cannot directly control users’
decisions, we propose using pricing to indirectly enforce users
to internalize their negative externality in decision making.
Pricing is a key tool to allocate resources to the users who
value them the most, thus controlling congestion in resource
competition cases [31], [32]. However, only a small body of
works have studied MEC from an economics viewpoint. Ex-
isting works from the economics viewpoint such as [33]–[35]
are based on abstract utility functions (e.g., a simple logarithm
function of the amount of product), and do not capture various
user-side factors, such as the processing capacity of mobile
device users and the amount of remaining computing tasks.
The work [36] takes those user-side factors into account, and
proposes Lyapunov-based algorithms for energy/monetary cost
minimization while ensuring finite processing delay. Similar
to other Lyapunov-based algorithms proposed by [18]–[21],
the implementation of this work requires heavy signalling
overhead to share the queueing states of users and the AP
at each time slot. Besides, since to perform centralized op-
timization, the AP also requires knowledge of users’ private
information, such as their sensitiveness towards money and
energy. Generally, users are unwilling to share and might
cheat on such private information, to get more resources.
In this paper, we aim to provide users with the appropriate
incentives to control their flows and improve the overall system
performance in a distributed way.
To that end, we introduce an economics model encapsu-
lating physical layer factors, such as the wireless channel
condition, the computational energy and delay of both local
and edge computing. Queuing delay and job scheduling is an
important factor to consider in MEC resource optimization
because relative to the cloud, the edge has less computational
resources and jobs need to be queued and scheduled. We
consider average delay (via statistical measurements over
time) since the prices should not fluctuate too often. Besides
optimizing over each user’s frequency of offloading, we also
optimize over the job scheduling sequence. This is because as
mentioned earlier, due to the varying delay sensitivity of jobs,
different users will have different negative valuations towards
delay experienced. Therefore, providing one class of service
will incur further welfare loss, on the part of users who have
high delay sensitivity. To deal with heterogeneous users, our
mechanism provides the option of priority, where it serves the
high priority jobs first for a higher service fee. Distinct prices
for the two priority classes will ensure truthfulness, preventing
all users from declaring priority. The prices will be set such
that in decision making, when users weigh their payoffs from
the two classes, they will choose the class and the offloading
frequency that jointly maximize system-wide welfare.
Our main contributions are summarized below.
1) We introduce a novel utility function (see Eq. (13)),
which, after subtracting the delay cost required by
edge computing, equals the profit a user achieves by
offloading (see Eq. (12)). This utility function measures
the difference between the local computing cost and
the offloading cost (including the offloading delay and
the offloading energy consumption). Besides, this utility
function satisfies the basic nature of the utility function
in economics, thus bridging the gap between the eco-
nomic and physical layer parameter optimizations.
2) Complete users’ individual demand information: Based
on the given utility function we propose an incentive-
aware job offloading framework, in which the user
decides the amount to offload by comparing its utility
function with the delay cost of edge computing. We
characterize the socially optimal point, as a function
of the users’ profit functions as well as the average
edge computing delays (see Theorem 1). Furthermore,
we derive in semi-closed form the prices which can
incentivise users to choose the correct priority class and
offload at a socially optimal frequency.
3) Without users’ individual demand information: We
3propose learning-based pricing mechanisms where no
knowledge of individual user profit functions is required
(see Algorithm 1 and 2). Instead, based on the mea-
sured congestion levels, the AP broadcasts prices and
expected edge delays of the distinct priority classes. At
equilibrium, the optimal prices and expected edge delays
are learnt, with which the AP induces self-interested
users to choose the correct priority class and make
socially optimal offloading decisions, thus maximizing
the system-wide welfare in a decentralized way (see
Theorem 2 and 3).
II. COMMUNICATION AND EDGE COMPUTING SYSTEM
MODEL
We consider an MEC system consisting of an access point
(AP) and N mobile users. The wireless AP could be a
base station, or a Wi-Fi access point. Other than being a
conventional access point to the core network, it is installed
with an additional edge computing server. The mobile devices
might be running computation-intensive and delay-sensitive
jobs, and may have insufficient computing power or limited
battery energy to complete those jobs. As such, they may
offload part/all of their jobs to the AP. In this section, we will
introduce the offloading policy, the wireless channel model,
followed by the models for computing in detail (see Fig. 1).
A. Job generation model and offloading policy
Jobs arrive at the mobile users following a Poisson process
of rate λa. The service time of a job is identically distributed
(i.i.d.) and exponentially distributed, with an average of La
bytes input data to offload. Denote the processing density by
Ba. Then the average CPU cycles to run for a job equals
µa = LaBa.
This paper considers the scenario with flat-fading channels,
and assume that the user can finish offloading in a channel
block. Hence, we consider the following offloading policy.
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Fig. 1: An MEC system illustration with job arrival, offloading
and computation.
When a job arrives, if the achievable rate is higher than a
threshold βk, the mobile user would offload its job to the AP;
otherwise, the mobile user will choose local computing.
B. Radio access model
Users access the AP in an FDMA mode, suffering no multi-
user interference. Let hk denote the small-scale channel gain
from user k to the AP. The achievable uplink data rate is thus,
Rk = log(1 + d
−α
k |hk|
2Ptr/σ
2), k = 1, 2, · · · , N, (1)
where dk denotes user k’s distance to the AP and α represents
the path loss exponent. Ptr is the transmission power and σ
2
denotes the received noise power at the AP. In addition, by
comparing the achievable data rate Rk with the expected data
rate βk and by Shannon’s theorem [37]: when Rk > βk the
mobile device can transmit its job to the AP successfully.
Hence, the user k’s offloading frequency (probability) is
xk = Pr(|hk|
2 > (eβk − 1)ρ−1k ), k = 1, 2, · · · , N, (2)
where ρk , d
−α
k Ptr/σ
2. A mobile user could control its
offloading frequency by adjusting the threshold βk.
C. Computation model
Based on the above radio access model and offloading
policy, we discuss the total overhead/cost of local computing
and edge computing. Both the processing delay and buffer
delay are taken into consideration.
1) Local computing: By the Poisson arrival process and
exponential job service time assumptions, we have an M/M/1
queue for local computing. Let fm be the mobile device’s
computing capability (CPU cycles per second), then the ex-
pected time spent per job (including both the job execution
time and the time spent awaiting in a local buffer) is
DLCk (xk) = 1/(µm − λax¯k), k = 1, 2, · · · , N. (3)
TABLE I: Summary of key notations
Notation Description
λa Job arrival rate at the mobile device (jobs per second)
µa Average CPU cycles needed by the computation job
Ba Processing density (in cycles/bit)
La The input data size (in Bytes)
κm The energy coefficient of the mobile device
xk User k’s offloading frequency
dk User k’s distance to the access point
Ptr Each user’s transmit power
σ2 Received noise power at the access point
ce
k
User k’s weight of the computational energy
cd
k
User k’s weight of the computational time
hk User k’s instantaneous small-scale channel gain
βk User k’s transmission rate
fm CPU-cycle frequency of the mobile device
µm Computing service rate of User k (jobs per second)
fB CPU-cycle frequency of the MEC server
µB Computing service rate of the MEC server (jobs per second)
gk User k’s demand function
N The total number of mobile device users
4where the local computing probability x¯k , 1 − xk, and the
service rate µm , fm/µa. Next, the computational energy of
local computing is
ELCk = κmf
2
mµa, k = 1, 2, · · · , N, (4)
where κmf
2
m is the power consumption the mobile device
user runs one CPU cycle, and κm is an energy consumption
coefficient that depends on the chip architecture [38].
The total weighted cost of local computing is
ZLCk (xk) = c
e
kE
LC
k + c
d
kD
LC
k (xk), k = 1, 2, · · · , N, (5)
where 0 < cek < 1 (in units 1/Joule) and 0 < c
d
k < 1 (in units
1/Second) are the weights of computational energy and delay.
The weights allow different users to place different emphasis
in decision making. For example, if the mobile device is at
a low battery state, it would give energy consumption more
emphasis, choosing a bigger value of cek. If the user is running
urgent jobs, it would give the delay cost more emphasis. In
this paper, we consider two classes of resource-hungry mobile
users with different service requirements, i.e., one class of
users setting cdk = c
d
H
, k = 1, · · · , NH, and the other setting
cdk = c
d
L
, k = NH + 1, · · · , NH +NL, where NH +NL = N .
2) Edge computing: First, the time taken to offload to the
AP is
DECk,1(xk) = laµa/βk(xk), k = 1, 2, · · · , N. (6)
This indicates that the energy required by offloading is
EECk (xk) = Ptrlaµa/βk(xk), k = 1, 2, · · · , N. (7)
Subsequently, the offloaded job will stay at the AP’s buffer
until it leaves after execution. For the purpose of increasing
the net welfare, the AP applies priority queueing, where it
provides different qualities of service to different classes of
traffic. Suppose that traffic classes are partitioned into two
sets, H and L. The job execution is FCFS, except that the
jobs from the class H are always given priority over those
from the class L, and the execution of an ordinary user’s job
is preempted if a priority user’s job arrives.
Based on the aforementioned offloading policy, the mobile
device will choose to offload its jobs with probability xk . This,
combined with the splitting property of the queueing theory
[39], indicates that the job offloading from a mobile device
user also follows a Poisson process, with parameter λaxk.
Hence, the job arrival at the AP is a superposition of multiple
Poisson processes from multiple mobile device users, which,
according to the superposition property of queueing theory
[39], is another Poisson process with arrival rate as the sum
arrival rate of the superposed processes. Therefore, the arrival
rate at the AP is
∑
ij=H
λaxj for the higher priority class of
users and
∑
ij=L
λaxj for the lower priority class of users. On
the other hand, the service times are i.i.d. and exponentially
distributed with parameter µa. As such, we get an M/M/1
queue with two priority classes for computing at the AP.
Let fB be the AP’s computing capability (CPU cycles
per second). The service rate of the mobile device is then
µB = fB/µa (jobs per second). Thus, for the user choosing
the first priority, the expected time a job spending at the AP
(including both the computation execution time and the time
spent awaiting in the edge buffer) can be expressed as,
DECH (x) =
1
µB −
∑
ij=H
λaxj
, (8)
where x , (x1, x2, · · · , xN ). For the user choosing second
priority, the expected time a job spends at the AP can be
expressed as,
DECL (x) =
µBD
EC
H
(x)
µB −
∑
ij=L
λaxj −
∑
ij=H
λaxj
. (9)
We neglect the energy overhead of edge computing as [16],
[27], [29], since normally the AP can access to wired charing
and it has no lack-of-energy issues. Combining (6) to (9) yields
the total weighted cost of edge computing by user k, i.e.,
ZECk (ik,x) = c
e
kE
EC
k (xk) + c
d
k(D
EC
k,1(xk) +D
EC
ik
(x)). (10)
Note that the total cost by offloading, as well as the edge
computing buffering delay DEC
ik
(x), depends on both the local
variable (i.e., xk for the k-th user) and also the offloading
frequency of other users. As we will see later, due to this
coupled nature of delay we have coupled objective functions.
III. PROPOSED ECONOMICS MODEL FOR MOBILE EDGE
COMPUTING AND PROBLEM FORMULATIONS
By the aforementioned offloading policy, when a job arrives
the mobile user will offload with probability xk, and locally
compute with probability x¯k. Hence, the expected total cost
of offloading is
Zk(ik,x) = x¯kZ
LC
k (xk) + xkZ
EC
k (ik,x). (11)
On the other hand, when there is no such edge server
providing computing power, users have to run jobs locally with
average cost ZLCk (0). Therefore the gross profit of offloading
by the k-th user under a given offloading strategy x is,
Vk(ik,x) = Z
LC
k (0)− Zk(ik,x), k = 1, · · · , N. (12)
The key idea of the economics model is to introduce the
utility function and the cost function. Some observations are
in order. Firstly, the profit each user obtains equals the cost
savings from offloading, and it is a linear combination of the
energy costs and the delay costs. Secondly, the coupled delay
cost DEC
ik
(x) reflects the harm/congestion each user causes to
the other users, with a bigger value indicating that the AP
provides worse service to the users. Thirdly, except for the
expected time spent at the AP, i.e., DEC
ik
(x), which depends
on all users’ offloading decisions, the other items in the profit
function only depend on each user’s own offloading frequency
xk. Motivated by these observations, we introduce a utility
function Uk(xk) which includes the items in the profit function
that only depend on the local variable xk , i.e.,
Uk(xk) =Z
LC
k (0)− x¯kZ
LC
k (xk)
− xk(c
e
kE
EC
k (xk) + c
d
kD
EC
k,1(xk)). (13)
This, combined with (12), indicates that
Vk(ik,x) = Uk(xk)− Ck(ik,x), k = 1, · · · , N, (14)
5where Ck(ik,x) , c
d
kxkD
EC
ik
(x) can be regarded as the delay
cost caused by sharing an MEC server at the AP.
Taking the derivative of Uk(xk) with respect to xk, we arrive
at the demand function of user k, i.e.,
gk(xk) ,
∂Uk(xk)
∂xk
.
For each mobile device user, it holds true that the demand
function gk(xk) is a monotonically decreasing function of
the offloading frequency xk. Moreover, there exists a unique
solution of the equation gk(xk) = 0, denoted as x
up
k .
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Fig. 2: The achievavble utility for varying distances to AP.
The utility function in (13) measures the welfare of offload-
ing, while containing physical layer meaning. It is illustrated
in Fig. 2, for a system with parameters set as in the numerical
results section. Different distances, i.e., d = 10m, d = 50m
and d = 70m, from the user to the AP are considered. One
can see that the utility function is strictly increasing while the
rate of increase, i.e., the demand, decreases as xk increases;
this is consistent with the law of diminishing marginal returns,
a typical property of utility functions in economics. Moreover,
the user closer to the AP has more offloading demand and can
achieve a higher utility for the same offloading amount. This
agrees with intuition that a user nearer the AP experiences a
better wireless channel.
A. Problem formulations
We first consider the social-welfare offloading decision
problem. Assume that the AP acts as a social planner. It would
like users to choose their offloading frequency such that the
net social welfare
∑N
k=1 Vk(x) is maximized as follows.
Problem 1 (Social Problem):
{¯i⋆k, x¯
⋆
k} ,arg max
{ik,xk}
∑
j
Vj(ij ,x),
s.t. ik ∈ {H,L}, 0 ≤ xk ≤ 1, ∀k. (15)
Intuitively, in Problem 1 each user should also be concerned
with the congestion it causes to other users and should keep
its offloading under an appropriate amount for other users’
welfare; the difficulty lies in how to incentivise users to do so
when users are selfish and will choose their offloading deci-
sions such that their individual profit Vk(xk) is maximized.
Pricing is a useful tool in incentivising users to choose the
socially optimal levels of demand. The key idea is to enforce
users to pay for the congestion they cause to the other users. In
the following Problem 2, we study the pricing-based scheme,
which charges users an additional edge computing service fee
to regulate users’ behavior.
Problem 2 (Regulated Selfish Problem):
{i⋆k, x
⋆
k} ,arg max
{ik,xk}
Uk(xk)− (c
d
kD
EC
ik
+ pik)xk,
s.t. ik ∈ {H,L}, 0 ≤ xk ≤ 1, ∀k. (16)
where pH and pL respectively denote the unit service fee for
the MEC service with high priority and low priority.
Does there exist price pair (pH, pL) such that the individual
objectives of self-interested users will be aligned with the
social welfare objective? If it exists, how to design simple
pricing schemes to achieve the highest net welfare? In the
following sections, we answer the above two questions.
IV. THE SOCIALLY OPTIMAL OFFLOADING MECHANISM
WITH ONE PRIORITY CLASS OF USERS
In this section, we first study a special case with only one
priority class of users, where each user sets the same weights
of computational delay and energy, i.e., cdk = c
d
H
andNH = N .
Since we only have one priority class, we denote by the edge
computing service fee as p.
In what follows, we will first analyze the structural property
of the formulated social and regulated selfish problems, and
admit in semi-closed form the optimal price as a function
of users’ profit functions. Based on these analyses, we then
propose an evolutional pricing algorithm, which requires no
individual utility functions and learns the correct price such
that the social welfare is maximized.
A. Optimal price for offloading under complete information
For the Social Problem, by the first order condition, at the
maximum is holds that
∂Uk(xk)/∂xk −
∑N
j=1
∂cdHxjD
EC
H (x)/∂xk = 0
⇔gk(xk) = c
d
HD
EC
H +
cd
H
∑N
j=1 λaxj
(µB −
∑N
j=1 λaxj)
2
, ∀k. (17)
where gk(xk) is the demand function of offloading.
By contrast, for the Regulated Selfish Problem, at the
maximum it holds that
gk(xk) = c
d
HD
EC
H + p, ∀k. (18)
Comparing (17) with (18) and for the purpose aligning the
individual objectives with the social welfare objective, the
price shall be set as
p(x) = cdH
∑N
j=1
λaxj/(µB −
∑N
j=1
λaxj)
2. (19)
Here p(x) is also referred to as the congestion level, since
in our mechanism we propose using pricing to indirectly en-
force users to internalize their negative externality in decision
making.
Solving the equations in (17) and substituting the optimal
offloading decisions, denoted by x¯⋆k, ∀k, into (19), we arrive at
the optimal price p⋆ that induces self-interested users to make
socially optimal offloading decisions.
6B. Learning-based pricing which induces social-optimal of-
floading
That derivation of the optimal price p⋆ requires solving for
x¯⋆k based on users’ report of their individual utility functions.
These worthy functions include some private information such
as their locations and battery states. Generally, users are not
willing to share these private information. To that end, we
propose an evolutional pricing algorithm, which requires no
knowledge of individual utility functions and learns the correct
price based on the observed congestion level.
Stage 1: AP adjusts price/delay pair of 
EC
( ; )
t t
p D
Stage 2: Each user decides its offloading frequency 
AP broadcasts the 
expected price/delay
The congestion level 
observed by the AP
Fig. 3: Schematic view of the learning-based pricing scheme
for one priority class of users.
As shown in Fig. 3, at each time slot t, the AP observes
pt−1true, the congestion level caused by users’ offloading deci-
sions. Based on the congestion level, the AP computes and
broadcasts the unit service fee pt and delay Dt
EC
signals to
users. Note that by comparing (8) and (19), for a given pt we
have a corresponding Dt
EC
as follows
DtEC = 1/(2µB) +
√
pt/(cd
H
µB) + 1/4µ2B. (20)
Viewing the signals, users decide on their offloading frequency
xtk, which maximizes their individual welfare according to
(18). The AP will observe this new congestion level pttrue. The
above process iterates until convergence when the resulting
congestion level, pttrue, equals the price p
t set, meaning that
we have learnt the optimal price and arrived at the socially
optimal equilibrium.
The key point in Fig. 3 is to provide a method to adjust
the price/delay pair based on the observed congestion level,
such that the iterative process converges at the socially optimal
price. By definition, it can be verified that the demand function
g(xk) is monotonically deceasing with respect to xk . Besides,
both the average edge delay and the congestion level increase
as more jobs are offloaded to the AP. As such, if pt < p⋆, the
resulting xtk > x
⋆
k, which results in a higher congestion level
than pt, i.e., pttrue > p
t. Therefore, by contraposition pt >
pttrue indicates that p
t > p⋆. As such, the AP shall decrease the
price if pt > pttrue. Otherwise, the AP shall increase the price.
Please refer to Algorithm 1 for more details on the learning
process.
Convergence of Algorithm 1: According to Algorithm 1, a
price of pt, with pt < p⋆, results in a congestion level higher
than pt, while the inverse case results in a congestion level
lower than pt. Therefore, with a bisection search over the price
pt, we can always find the price inducing the correct offloading
policy such that the resulting congestion level equals the price.
This indicates the convergence of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Learning-based pricing algorithm for one priority
class of users
1: Initialize: t← 0, pt ← rand, Dt
EC
← by (20), pLB ← 0
2: xtk ← g
−1
k (c
d
H
Dt
EC
+ pt), k = 1, 2, · · · , N ⊲ by (18)
3: pttrue ← by (19)
4: while pt < pttrue do ⊲ Learn lower/upper bounds
5: pLB ← p
t
6: t← t+ 1, pt ← 2pLB, D
t
EC
← by (20)
7: Repeat steps 2-3
8: end
9: pUB ← p
t
10: while pUB − pLB > ǫ do ⊲ Bisection search
11: t← t+ 1, pt ← (pLB + pUB)/2, D
t
EC
← by (20)
12: Repeat steps 2-3
13: if pt < pttrue then
14: pLB ← p
t
15: else
16: pUB ← p
t
17: end
18: end ⊲ The stop threshold ǫ = 0.01
19: return p← pt and DEC ← Dt
EC
V. THE SOCIALLY OPTIMAL OFFLOADING MECHANISM
WITH TWO PRIORITY CLASSES OF USERS
In this section, we extend our results to the more complex
scenario with two priority classes of users. The priority
queue is offered, wherein other than optimizing over each
user’s frequency of offloading, we also need to optimize over
the job scheduling sequence. This is because as mentioned
earlier, different users might have different negative valuations
towards delay experienced. Therefore, providing one class of
service will incur further welfare loss, on the part of users have
high delay sensitivity. To deal with heterogeneous users, our
mechanism provides the option of priority, where it serves the
high priority users first for a higher service fee. Distinct prices
for the two priority classes will ensure truthfulness, preventing
all users from declaring priority. The prices will be set such
that in decision making, when users weigh their payoffs from
the two classes, they will choose the class that maximizes
social welfare.
In what follows, we first analyze the structural property of
the formulated social and regulated selfish problems and admit
in semi-closed form the optimal prices that induce socially
optimal offloading decisions, which, however, requires users’
individual profit functions. As such, in the second subsection,
we propose an evolutional pricing algorithm, which requires
no individual utility functions and learns the correct prices
based on the congestion level.
A. Optimal price for offloading under complete information
Before proceeding, we first introduce a lemma as follows.
Lemma 1: For the purpose of minimizing the total delay
cost, the mobile device users putting more consideration to
the delay cost, i.e., cdk = c
d
H
, shall be given the higher priority
service, i.e., ik = H.
7gk(xk) =


cdkD
EC
H
(x) +
∑NH
j=1
λac
d
H
xj
Ψ2
H
+
∑NL
j=1
λaµB(ΨH +Ψ)c
d
L
xj
Ψ2Ψ2
H
, if cdk = c
d
H
,
cdkD
EC
L
(x) +
∑NL
j=1
λaµBc
d
L
xj
Ψ2ΨH
, if cdk = c
d
L
.
(24)
Proof: According to the famous cµ rule (or, here, the
cdkµa rule) [40], providing a higher priority to those users with
a higher value of delay cost, is optimal in terms of minimizing
the system-wide delay cost. This completes the proof.
Based on Lemma 1, the mobile users with higher delay costs
shall be given a higher priority service, while those with lower
delay costs shall wait in the queue for the AP finish executing
higher priority jobs. Therefore, the expression of delays in (8)
and (9) can be respectively rewritten as,
DECH (x) = 1/ΨH, (21a)
DECL (x) = µBD
EC
H (x)/Ψ. (21b)
where ΨH , µB −
∑
cd
j
=cd
H
λaxj and Ψ , µB −
∑
j λaxj .
For the Social Problem, by the first order condition, at the
maximum is holds that
∂Uk(xk)
∂xk
−
∑N
j=1
∂cdjxjD
EC
ij
(x)
∂xk
= 0
⇔gk(xk) = c
d
kD
EC
ik
(x) +
∑N
j=1
∂cdjD
EC
ij
(x)
∂xk
xj . (22)
Substituting (21a) and (21b) into (22) and by further deriva-
tions, we arrive at the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Considering an MEC network consisting of two
priority classes of users, the optimal offloading frequencies of
the mobile device users are given by solving the following
equations,
gk(xk) = c
d
kD
EC
ik
(x) +
∑NH
j=1
∂cd
H
DEC
H
(x)
∂xk
xj
+
∑NL
j=1
∂cd
L
DEC
L
(x)
∂xk
xj , k = 1, 2, · · · , N, (23)
which equals solving the equations (24) at the top of this page.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 1: By solving the N equations in (23), we obtain
the offloading solutions of the Social Problem. Furthermore,
this solution is unique.
In contrast, for the Regulated Selfish Problem, at the max-
imum it holds that
gk(xk) = c
d
kD
EC
ik
+ pik , ∀k. (25)
Comparing (25) with (23) and for the purpose of aligning
the individual objectives with the social welfare objective, the
price shall be set as,
pik =
∑NH
j=1
∂cd
H
DEC
H
(x)
∂xk
xj +
∑NL
j=1
∂cd
L
DEC
L
(x)
∂xk
xj .
In addition, according to Lemma 1, the mobile users with
lower delay costs shall be given lower priority service, in
which case the derivative ∂DEC
H
(x)/∂xk = 0. Hence, for the
users with higher delay cost and those with lower delay cost,
the AP shall respectively charge them with a service fee as
follows,
pH =
NH∑
j=1
∂cd
H
DEC
H
(x)
∂xk
xj +
NL∑
j=1
∂cd
L
DEC
L
(x)
∂xk
xj , (26a)
pL =
NL∑
j=1
∂cd
L
DEC
L
(x)
∂xk
xj . (26b)
Theorem 2: For any given price pair (pH , pL) satisfying
(26a)(26b) and the expected delay pair (DEC
H
, DEC
L
) satisfying
(21a)(21b), it is in all the mobile device users’ self-interest to
classify their jobs in their correct priority class, i.e.,
pik + c
d
kD
EC
ik
< p¯ik + c
d
kD
EC
i¯k
, ik ∈ {H,L}.
where i¯k = L if ik = H, and i¯k = H if ik = L. Moreover,
the resulting offloading frequencies maximize the net welfare
of all the mobile device users.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 2: Based on Theorem 2, one can see that the given
price pair (pH , pL) is incentive-compatible. That is, under this
pricing mechanism, rational users will choose to pay the right
class service fee and join the right priority class in terms of
social welfare maximization.
Substituting the optimal solution derived by Theorem 1
into (26a)(26b), we arrive at the right prices that the AP
shall set for the purpose of inducing users to choose the
right priority class. However, the derivation of the optimal
offloading frequency solution in Theorem 1 requires users’
individual profit functions. In the following subsection, we
derive an evolutional pricing algorithm, which requires no
knowledge of individual utility functions and learns the correct
prices, such that social welfare is maximized.
B. Learning-based pricing which induces social-optimal of-
floading
Similar to the information flow in Fig. 3, at each time slot
t, the AP observes Dtrue,t
H,EC and D
true,t
L,EC , the congestion level
caused by users’ offloading decisions. Based on the congestion
level, the AP computes and broadcasts the unit service fees
pt
H
and pt
L
, and delay Dt
H,EC and D
t
L,EC signals to users.
Viewing those prices and expected delays information, users
then decide their priority class and offloading frequency to
maximize their individual welfare. Please see Fig. 4 for the
schematic view.
However, it is not easy to extend the evolutional pricing
algorithm for the case with one priority class of users here,
since other than inducing users to offload at the social optimal
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Fig. 4: Schematic view of the learning-based pricing scheme
for two priority classes of users.
offloading frequency, the correct prices also need to induce
users to choose the correct priority class.
The key idea is to adjust prices according to (26a)(26b).
Some observations are in order. First, given a pair of average
delays, i.e., DEC
H
and DEC
L
, we can respectively determine
the sum offloading rate of the two distinct priority classes of
users according to (21a) and (21b), which further decides the
corresponding prices according to (26a)(26b). Substituting the
average delays and prices into (25), users can compute the
offloading frequency that maximizes their’ individual profit.
Second, according to Theorem 2, given any delay pairs and
price pairs respectively satisfying (21a)(21b) and (26a)(26b),
it is in all the mobile device users’ self-interest to classify
their jobs in their correct priority class. That is, those price
pairs are incentive-compatible candidates. Third, the demand
function g(xk) is monotonically deceasing with respect to
xk. As such, if the right hand side of (25), i.e., the total
cost, is less than that at the social optimal equilibrium, the
resulting offloading frequency xtk > x
⋆
k, which results in a high
congestion level. Based on these observations, we propose
Algorithm 2 as follows.
Specifically, the whole algorithm consists of two embedded
loops, where in the outer loop the AP updates the expected
average delay of Dt
H,EC for the high priority queue, while in
the inner loop the AP updates the expected average delay of
Dt
L,EC for the low priority queue.
In the inner loop and at each time slot, the AP observes
Dtrue,t−1
L,EC , the congestion level of the low priority queue,
caused by users’ offloading decisions. Based on the observed
congestion level, the AP computes the expected average delay
Dt
L,EC for the low priority queue, which, combined with
Dt
H,EC, decides the unit service fee p
t
H
and pt
L
. Following
which, the AP broadcasts the service fee and expected delay
signals to users. Viewing the signals, users decide which
priority class to join and determine their offloading frequency
xtk based on (25) to maximize their individual welfare. The
above process iterates until convergence when the resulting
congestion level Dtrue,t
L,EC equals the expected average delay set,
i.e., Dt
L,EC.
In the outer loop and at each iteration, the AP observes
Dtrue,t−1
H,EC , the congestion level of the high priority queue.
Based on the observed congestion level, the AP computes the
expected average delayDt
H,EC for the high priority queue. The
inner loop (steps 5-26) is then executed until the congestion
level of the low priority queue converges to its expected
Algorithm 2 Learning-based pricing algorithm for two priority
classes of users
1: Initialize: t← 0, Dt
H,EC ← µ
−1
B + ς , D
true,t
H,EC ← 0
2: while Dt
H,EC > D
true,t
H,EC do ⊲ Learn lower/upper bounds
3: DUB
H,EC ← D
t
H,EC
4: t← t+ 1, Dt
H,EC ← max{D
t
H,EC/2, µ
−1
B }
5: Dt
L,EC ← µBD
t
H,ECD
t
H,EC
6: (pt
H
, pt
L
)← by (21a)(21b) and (26a)(26b)
7: i⋆k ← argminik(p
t
ik
+ cdkD
t
ik,EC
)
8: xtk ← g
−1
k (p
t
i⋆
k
+ cdkD
t
i⋆
k
,EC), k = 1, 2, · · · , N
9: Dtrue,t
L,EC ← by substituting x
t
k into (21b)
10: while Dt
L,EC < D
true,t
L,EC do
11: DLB
L,EC ← D
t
L,EC
12: t← t+ 1, Dt
L,EC ← 2D
t
L,EC, D
t
H,EC ← D
t
H,EC
13: Execute steps 6-9
14: end
15: DUB
L,EC ← D
t
L,EC
16: while DUB
L,EC −D
LB
L,EC > ǫ do ⊲ Bisection search
17: t← t+ 1
18: Dt
L,EC ← (D
UB
L,EC +D
LB
L,EC)/2, D
t
H,EC ← D
t
H,EC
19: Execute steps 6-9
20: if Dt
L,EC < D
true,t
L,EC then
21: DLB
L,EC ← D
t
L,EC
22: else
23: DUB
L,EC ← D
t
L,EC
24: end
25: end ⊲ The stop threshold ǫ = 0.01
26: Dtrue,t
H,EC ← by substituting x
t
k into (21a)
27: end
28: DLB
H,EC ← D
t
H,EC
29: while DUB
H,EC −D
LB
H,EC > ǫ do ⊲ Bisection search
30: t← t+ 1, Dt
H,EC ← (D
UB
H,EC +D
LB
H,EC)/2
31: Execute steps 5-26
32: if Dt
H,EC < D
true,t
H,EC then
33: DLB
H,EC ← D
t
H,EC
34: else
35: DUB
H,EC ← D
t
H,EC
36: end
37: end
38: return pH ← p
t
H
, pL ← p
t
L
, DEC
H
← Dt
H,EC, D
EC
L
←
Dt
L,EC
average delay. Back to outer loop, the AP will check ifDtrue,t
H,EC ,
the observed congestion level of the high priority queue has
converged to Dt
H,EC, its expected average delay. If not, the
outer loop will change its expected average delay again, and
continue with the inner loop (steps 5-26). Otherwise, the entire
process stops and we have arrived at the optimal prices and
expected delays of the two priority classes that maximize the
system-wide welfare.
The following theorem proves that Algorithm 2 converges.
Theorem 3: Algorithm 2 finally converges to a socially
optimal point where users classify their jobs in their correct
priority class and offload at the offloading frequencies which
9jointly maximize the system-wide welfare.
Proof: See Appendix C.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical simulations which
substantiate our theoretical results. The simulations show the
convergence and optimality of our proposed pricing mecha-
nisms, and give us some insight into the system performance
at the optimal allocation.
A number of 100 mobile users are uniformly placed at
random on a ring of radius 10 ≤ dk ≤ 75 (unit: meters) whose
center is located at the AP. The path loss exponent is α = 3.5.
The channels are assumed to be identically distributed (i.i.d.)
and |hk|
2 ∼ exp(1). The other parameters are summarized in
Table II.
TABLE II: Simulation Parameters [18], [21], [41]
Parameter Value Parameter Value
W 360KHz κm 10−27Watt · s3/cycles3
Ptr 100mW Ba 8250 cycles/bit
σ2 -40dBm La 100K Bytes
α 3.5 λa 0.01 jobs/s
fB 3GHz c
d
k
{0.9,0.1}
fm 0.5GHz cek {0.1,0.9}
A. The case with one priority class of users
In this subsection we consider the scenario where users
have the same computational energy and delay requirements
(cdk = c
d
H
) and one priority class is offered. To learn the price
and delay pair that achieve optimal social welfare, the AP
implements our learning based pricing mechanism (Algorithm
1, Section 4.2).
Fig. 5 illustrates the convergence and optimality of our
proposed pricing mechanisms for the one priority class with
users setting cdk = 0.1. Specifically, Fig. 5(a) and 6(b) illustrate
the convergence of our proposed algorithm. In particular,
the average delay DtEC and price p
t both converge after
only a few iterations, learning the price and delay which
achieves optimal social welfare. Convergence to optimality
occurs despite the AP not having knowledge of the users’
utility functions. The only information required on the part of
the AP is the congestion level, which it can measure. As seen,
the algorithm converges quickly, after only several iterations,
making it suitable for future extension and implementation in
dynamic and online scenarios.
Fig. 5(c) plots
Cost by the proposed scheme
Cost by local computing only
(%) for each
user. It can be seen that at the equilibrium point of our
proposed pricing scheme Algorithm 1, all users obtain the
optimal cost savings. Fig. 5(c) also shows that the closer the
user is to the AP, the higher the cost savings achieved. Fig.
5(d) illustrates the offloading frequency of different users, who
have different distances from the AP. As expected, the users
closer to the AP offload jobs at higher frequencies. This is
because, the users closer to the AP experience better channels.
As such, they can offload with higher rates and less energy.
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Fig. 5: (a) Posted delay v.s. time; (b) Posted price v.s. time;
(c) Cost percentage as compared with that by local computing
only; (d) Offloading frequency v.s. users’ distance to the AP.
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For comparison, in Fig. 6 we plot the result for the scenario
with computational weight of cdk = 0.9. One can see that for
the former case, the posted delay converges to a bigger value
while the price converges to a smaller value (see Fig. 5). This
is consistent with intuition that for users with less emphasis
on delay, they are more tolerant of a larger computing delay
and are less willing to pay for the service.
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B. The case with two priority classes of users
In this subsection, we consider the heterogeneous scenario
where users have varying computational delay and energy
requirements, and a priority based pricing mechanism offering
two priority classes (Algorithm 2 in Section 5.2) is proposed to
maximize the overall welfare of heterogeneous users. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the first 50 mobile users
set their computational weights as cdk = 0.9 and the other 50
mobile users set their weights as cdk = 0.1.
In Fig. 7 we plot how the average delays and prices for both
the low and high priority classes varying over time. Recall that
Algorithm 2 consists of two embedded loops. In the inner loop
the expected average delay of the low priority class Dt
L,EC
is updated until the resulting congestion level Dtrue,t
L,EC equals
Dt
L,EC. While in the outer loop, the expected average delay
of the high priority class Dt
H,EC is updated, until the resulting
congestion level Dtrue,t
H,EC equals D
t
H,EC. This embedded loop
structure can be visualised by the algorithm’s trajectory in the
figures. From Fig. 7, we can see that our mechanism learns the
optimal delays and prices for both classes. The AP learns these
optimal values without knowledge of users’ utility functions
(which encapsulate private information like battery states). It
can be seen that the optimal price for the high priority class is
around 3 times higher, because i) they are paying for the higher
delay they cause to the low priority users (see eq. (26a) and
(26b)), ii) they have low delay tolerance and would be willing
to pay a higher price for a lower average delay.
Fig. 8 illustrates the individual users’ cost per job as a
percentage of that by local computing only. The subplot Fig.
8(a) illustrates that at the equilibrium point of our mechanism,
the users achieve the optimal cost savings. As comparison,
in Fig. 8(b) we also plot the individual users’ cost by other
schemes without priority queue, the social scheme and the
selfish scheme. Specifically, in the social scheme we maximize
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Fig. 8: Job execution costs (%) via different schemes.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
The k-th user
(a
) 
O
ff
lo
a
d
in
g
 f
r
eq
u
e
n
cy
/D
is
ta
n
ce
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
The k-th user
(b
) 
O
ff
lo
a
d
in
g
 f
re
q
u
en
c
y
/D
is
ta
n
c
e
Optimal pricing scheme under complete information
Proposed learning-based pricing scheme
Distance/100
Social scheme without priority queue
Selfish scheme without priority queue
Distance/100
Fig. 9: Offloading frequency v.s. distance to the AP
the net welfare of users, while in the selfish problem users
maximize their individual interest. Similar to Subsection 4.1,
optimal solutions of these two schemes could be respectively
obtained by solving the equations arising from the derivatives
of the net welfare and users’ individual interest. From Fig.
8, we can see that as compared with the proposed scheme,
under the schemes without priority queue, users with stricter
delay requirement (i.e., bigger computational weight) suffers
from profit loss. This can be explained as follows. Given a
same expected value of average delay, users with a bigger
computational weight pay more due to the higher delay cost.
As such, their demand in offloading decreases. In contrast,
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Fig. 10: (a) Mean offloading frequency; (b) Average cost.
users with a smaller computational weight are more willing
to offload. Therefore, the former group of users cannot enjoy
well the cost saving brought by edge computing.
Fig. 9 illustrates the offloading frequency of different users,
and compares the results with that by the schemes without
priority queue. As expected, the users closer to the AP offload
jobs at higher frequencies. In addition, by comparison it can
be seen that the users with stricter delay requirements benefit
from the option of priority.
We conclude this section with Fig. 10, in which we run the
simulation for the four different schemes. In each simulation,
we place mobile users uniformly, and respectively plot the
resulting mean offloading frequency of users as well as the job
execution cost of the different schemes. From Fig. 10, we can
see that by providing the option of priority, users offload more
often, which results in bigger cost savings (almost reduced
30% of the cost, as compared to local computing only).
In contrast, users offload more under the selfish scheme, as
compared to the social scheme, however, they suffer from an
improper high congestion level. As such, they suffer welfare
loss on average.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an incentive-aware offload-
ing control mechanism for an MEC system, which consists
of an access point (AP) of finite computing power, and
serves two class of resource-hungry and selfish mobile users
via charging users a edge computing service fee. Different
users might have different service requirements. To deal with
heterogeneous users, our mechanism provides the option of
priority, in which it serves the high priority users first for a
higher service fee. We started with a special case with only
one priority class of users, for which we have characterized
in semi-closed form the optimal prices to incentivise socially
optimal offloading under complete profit functions of users.
Besides, we have considered the practical scenario where the
AP has no knowledge of user profit functions, and proposed
a learning based pricing mechanism. Then, we have extended
these results to the case with two priority classes of users,
under both the complete and the unknown profit information of
users. We have proved that the proposed mechanisms converge
to the optimal prices and expected edge delays. At equilibrium,
the AP induces self-interested users to choose the correct
priority class and make socially optimal offloading decisions,
thus maximizing the system-wide welfare in a decentralized
way.
This work assumed that the MEC server executes jobs one
after another. A more powerful MEC server may apply parallel
edge computing, which can handle more complex systems
running higher processing density jobs. Thus, further work
is needed to take parallel computing into account. Also, for
the purpose of gaining thorough insight into the computing
resource allocation, in this paper we have considered the
scenario in which users access to the AP via an FDMA mode.
As such, users suffer no wireless interference from each other
when offloading data to the AP. This alleviates the additional
stress in radio resource allocation. An interesting alternative is
to combine with the radio resource allocation and investigate
the scaling laws of communication/computation latency with
respect to network-load parameters.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF Theorem 1
According to Lemma 1, for the purpose of maximizing the
net welfare of users, a user with stricter delay requirement shall
choose the higher priority service; otherwise, it shall choose
the lower priority service. As such, the edge computing delay
can be rewritten as follows,
DECij (x) =
{
DEC
H
(x), if cdj = c
d
H
,
DEC
L
(x), if cdj = c
d
L
,
(27)
where DEC
H
(x) and DEC
L
(x) are given by (21a) and (21b),
respectively. Substituting (27) into (22) yields (23).
Besides, taking the derivative of the formula in (21a) with
respect to xk yields
∂DEC
H
(x)
∂xk
=
{
λa/Ψ
2
H
, if cdk = c
d
H
,
0, if cdk = c
d
L
.
(28)
Similarly, taking the derivative of the formula in (21b) yields
∂DEC
L
(x)
∂xk
=


λaµB(ΨH +Ψ)
Ψ2Ψ2
H
, if cdk = c
d
H
,
λaµB
Ψ2ΨH
, if cdk = c
d
L
.
(29)
Substituting (28) and (29) into (23), we have (24). This
completes the proof.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF Theorem 2
In this section, we will prove the following two equations,
thus completing the proof of Theorem 2.
pH + c
d
HD
EC
H < pL + c
d
HD
EC
L , (30a)
pL + c
d
LD
EC
L < pH + c
d
LD
EC
H . (30b)
Combining (26a)(26b) and (28)(29), we arrive at
pH − pL =
∑NH
j=1
λac
d
H
xj
Ψ2
H
+
∑NL
j=1
λaµBc
d
L
xj(ΨH +Ψ)
Ψ2Ψ2
H
−
∑NL
j=1
λaµBc
d
L
xj
Ψ2ΨH
=cdH
∑NH
j=1 λaxj
Ψ2
H
+
µBc
d
L
Ψ2ΨH
Ψ(ΨH −Ψ)
ΨH
(31a)
<
µBc
d
H
ΨΨH
−
cd
H
ΨH
=cdH(D
EC
L −D
EC
H ), (31b)
where (31a) comes from the fact that ΨH−Ψ =
∑NL
j=1 λaxj ;
the inequality in (31b) comes from the fact that cd
H
> cd
L
.
Similarly, it can be verified that the last inequality in (31b) can
be replaced by pH − pL > c
d
L
(DEC
L
−DEC
H
). This completes
the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF Theorem 3
Let (D⋆
L,EC, D
⋆
H,EC) and (p
⋆
L
, p⋆
H
) respectively represent
the optimal delays and prices arising from the system-wide
welfare offloading, denoted by x⋆k . In the following, we will
respectively show the convergence of the inner and the outer
loop, followed by the proof that Algorithm 2 converges to
the offloading decisions that jointly maximzie the system-wide
welfare.
(1) For any given fixed average delay of the high priority
queue, i.e., Dt
H,EC = DH,EC, the inner loop converges to
a point where Dtrue,t
L,EC = D
t
L,EC. Some observations are
in order. First, when setting Dt
L,EC = DH,EC + ς we get
Dtrue,t
L,EC > D
t
L,EC, and when setting D
t
L,EC = ∞ − ς
we get Dtrue,t
L,EC < D
t
L,EC. Here ς is an almost zero but
positive value. Second, Dtrue,t
L,EC is a decreasing function of
Dt
L,EC ∈ (DH,EC,∞). This can be proved as follows. Assume
that Dt1
L,EC < D
t2
L,EC. Then, p
t1
H
< pt2
H
and pt1
L
< pt2
L
. This,
combined with the fact that the demand function gk(xk) in
(25) is monotonically decreasing, indicates that xt1k > x
t2
k .
Hence, it holds that Dtrue,t1
L,EC > D
true,t2
L,EC . Concluding the
above observations, the inner loop converges to a point where
Dtrue,t
L,EC = D
t
L,EC, where, for the ease of exposition, we
respectively useDe
L,EC, p
e
L
and pe
H
to represent the equilibrium
delay and prices.
(2) The outer loop converges to the optimal point where
Dtrue,t
H,EC = D
t
H,EC = D
⋆
H,EC. In the following, we will
prove by contradiction that Dtrue,t
H,EC < D
t
H,EC holds true only
if Dt
H,EC > D
⋆
H,EC; the argument for the inverse case is
similar. Concluding, the outer loop converges to a point where
Dtrue,t
H,EC = D
t
H,EC = D
⋆
H,EC.
Assume Dt
H,EC ≤ D
⋆
H,EC. Then, we have the following
inference.
i) Its embedded inner loop converges to a point where
peL + c
d
LD
e
L,EC ≤ p
⋆
L + c
d
LD
⋆
L,EC; (32)
otherwise, assume that pe
L
+ cd
L
De
L,EC > p
⋆
L
+ cd
L
D⋆
L,EC, and
since the demand function gk(xk) in (25) is monotonically de-
creasing with respect to xk , the resulting offloading frequency
of users associated with the low priority queue satisfies xk <
x⋆k. This, combined with the assumption D
t
H,EC ≤ D
⋆
H,EC,
indicates that pe
L
+cd
L
De
L,EC < p
⋆
L
+cd
L
D⋆
L,EC, which, however,
contradicts with the assumption.
ii) It holds that Dtrue,t
H,EC ≥ D
t
H,EC. This can be explained as
follows. By Algorithm 2, the posted average edge delay and
price candidates always respectively satisfying (21a)(21b) and
(26a)(26b), based on which it can be verified that
peH + c
d
HD
t
H,EC
= (cdH − c
d
L)µBD
t
H,EC
2
+ peL + c
d
LD
e
L,EC (33a)
≤ (cdH − c
d
L)µBD
⋆
H,EC
2 + p⋆L + c
d
LD
⋆
L,EC (33b)
= p⋆H + c
d
HD
⋆
H,EC, (33c)
where (33b) comes from the inference (32) and the assumption
Dt
H,EC ≤ D
⋆
H,EC. In addition, since the demand function
gk(xk) is monotonically decreasing with respect to xk, the
resulting offloading frequency of users associated with the
high priority queue satisfies xk ≥ x
⋆
k. As such, it holds that
Dtrue,t
H,EC ≥ D
⋆
H,EC ≥ D
t
H,EC.
The second inference contradicts with the fact thatDtrue,t
H,EC <
Dt
H,EC. This completes the proof that D
true,t
H,EC < D
t
H,EC holds
true only if Dt
H,EC > D
⋆
H,EC.
(3) Combining the above analysis (1) and (2), one can see
that Algorithm 2 converges to a point where Dtrue,t
L,EC = D
t
L,EC
and Dtrue,t
H,EC = D
t
H,EC. This, combined with Theorem 1,
indicates that Algorithm 2 converges to offloading decisions
that jointly maximize the system-wide welfare. This completes
the proof.
REFERENCES
[1] A. B. Ericsson, “Ericsson mobility report: On the pulse of the networked
society,” in Tech. Rep. EAB-14 61078, Ericsson, Sweden, 2015.
[2] M. Satyanarayanan, P. Bahl, R. Caceres, and N. Davies, “The case for
VM-based cloudlets in mobile computing,” IEEE Pervasive Comput.,
vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 14–23, Oct. 2009.
[3] P. Mach and Z. Becvar, “Mobile edge computing: A survey on architec-
ture,” IEEE Commun. Surveys & Tuts., vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 1628–1656,
Third quarter 2017.
[4] Y. Mao, C. You, J. Zhang, and et al., “A survey on mobile edge
computing: The communication perspective,” IEEE Commun. Surveys
& Tuts., vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 2322–2358, Fourth quarter 2017.
[5] W. Yu, F. Liang, X. He, and et al., “A survey on the edge computing
for the internet of things,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, 2018.
[6] Y. Mao, J. Zhang, and K. B. Letaief, “Dynamic computation offloading
for mobile-edge computing with energy harvesting devices,” IEEE J.
Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 34, no. 12, pp. 3590–3605, Dec. 2016.
[7] C. You, K. Huang, and H. Chae, “Energy efficient mobile cloud
computing powered by wireless energy transfer,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas
Commun., vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 1757–1771, May 2016.
[8] J. Liu, Y. Mao, J. Zhang, and K. B. Letaief, “Delay-optimal computation
task scheduling for mobile-edge computing systems,” in Proc. IEEE
ISIT, Barcelona, Spain, Jul. 2016, pp. 1451–1455.
13
[9] Y. Tao, C. You, P. Zhang, and K. Huang, “Stochastic control of
computation offloading to a dynamic helper,” in ICC Workshops, Kansas
City, MO, USA, May 2018.
[10] Y. Mao, J. Zhang, S. H. Song, and K. B. Letaief, “Power-delay
tradeoff in multi-user mobile-edge computing systems,” in GLOBECOM,
Washington, DC, USA, Dec. 2016, pp. 1–6.
[11] ——, “Stochastic joint radio and computational resource management
for multi-user mobile-edge computing systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 16, no. 9, pp. 5994–6009, Sep. 2017.
[12] C. You, K. Huang, H. Chae, and B.-H. Kim, “Energy-efficient resource
allocation for mobile-edge computation offloading,” IEEE Trans. Wire-
less Commun., vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 1397–1411, Mar. 2017.
[13] M.-H. Chen, B. Liang, and D. Ming, “Joint offloading and resource
allocation for computation and communication in mobile cloud with
computing access point,” in INFOCOM, Atlanta, GA, USA, Apr. 2017,
pp. 1863–1871.
[14] T. Q. Dinh, J. Tang, Q. D. La, and T. Q. S. Quek, “Adaptive computation
scaling and task offloading in mobile edge computing,” in WCNC, San
Francisco, CA, USA, Mar. 2017, pp. 1–6.
[15] L. Pu, X. Chen, J. Xu, and X. Fu, “D2D fogging: An energy-efficient and
incentive-aware task offloading framework via network-assisted D2D
collaboration,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 34, no. 12, pp. 3887–
3901, Dec. 2016.
[16] F. Wang and X. Zhang, “Dynamic interface-selection and resource
allocation over heterogeneous mobile edge-computing wireless networks
with energy harvesting,” in INFOCOM WKSHPS, Honolulu, HI, USA,
Apr. 2018, pp. 190–195.
[17] F. Guo, L. Ma, H. Zhang, H. Ji, and X. Li, “Joint load management and
resource allocation in the energy harvesting powered small cell networks
with mobile edge computing,” in INFOCOM WKSHPS, Honolulu, HI,
USA, Apr. 2018, pp. 754–759.
[18] J. Kwak, Y. Kim, J. Lee, and S. Chong, “DREAM: Dynamic resource
and task allocation for energy minimization in mobile cloud systems,”
IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 33, no. 12, pp. 2510–2523, Dec. 2015.
[19] G. Zhang, W. Zhang, Y. Chao, and L. Wang, “Energy-delay tradeoff
for dynamic offloading in mobile-edge computing system with energy
harvesting devices,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Informat., vol. 14, no. 10, pp.
4642–4655, Oct. 2018.
[20] T. Ouyang, Z. Zhou, and X. Chen, “Follow me at the edge: Mobility-
aware dynamic service placement for mobile edge computing,” IEEE J.
Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 99, no. 99, pp. 1–1, Sep. 2018.
[21] C.-F. Liu, M. Bennis, and H. V. Poor, “Latency and reliability-aware
task offloading and resource allocation for mobile edge computing,” in
GLOBECOM WKSHPS, Singapore, Dec. 2017, pp. 1–7.
[22] S.-W. Ko, K. Han, and K. Huang, “Wireless networks for mobile edge
computing: Spatial modeling and latency analysis,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 17, no. 8, pp. 5225–5240, Aug. 2018.
[23] S. Guo, D. Wu, H. Zhang, and D. Yuan, “Queueing network model and
average delay analysis for mobile edge computing,” in ICNC WKSHPS,
Maui, Hawaii, USA, Mar. 2018, pp. 172–176.
[24] S. Rao and E. R. Petersen, “Optimal pricing of priority services,”
Operations Research, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 46–56, Jan. 1998.
[25] X. Lyu, H. Tian, C. Sengul, and P. Zhang, “Multiuser joint task offload-
ing and resource optimization in proximate clouds,” IEEE Trans. Veh.
Technol., vol. 66, no. 4, pp. 3435–3447, Apr. 2017.
[26] X. Chen, “Decentralized computation offloading game for mobile cloud
computing,” IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst., vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 974–
983, Apr. 2015.
[27] X. Chen, L. Jiao, W. Li, and X. Fu, “Efficient multi-user computation
offloading for mobile-edge cloud computing,” IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw.,
vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 2795–2808, Oct. 2016.
[28] S. Guo, B. Xiao, Y. Yang, and Y. Yang, “Energy-efficient dynamic
offloading and resource scheduling in mobile cloud computing,” in
INFOCOM, San Francisco, CA, USA, Apr. 2016, pp. 1–9.
[29] J. Zheng, Y. Cai, Y. Wu, and X. S. Shen, “Dynamic computation
offloading for mobile cloud computing: A stochastic game-theoretic
approach,” IEEE Trans. Mobile Comput., vol. 99, no. 99, pp. 1–1, 2018.
[30] L. Tang and X. Chen, “An efficient social-aware computation offloading
algorithm in cloudlet system,” in GLOBECOM, Washington, DC, USA,
Dec. 2016, pp. 1–6.
[31] C. Courcoubetis and R. Weber, Pricing Communication Networks:
Economics, Technology and Modelling. Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley,
2003.
[32] J. Huang and L. Gao, Wireless Network Pricing. San Rafael, CA, USA:
Morgan & Claypool, 2013.
[33] W. Fang, X. Yao, X. Zhao, J. Yin, and N. Xiong, “A stochastic control
approach to maximize profit on service provisioning for mobile cloudlet
platforms,” IEEE Trans. Syst., Man, Cybern., Syst., vol. 48, no. 4, pp.
522–534, Apr. 2018.
[34] A.-L. Jin, W. Song, P. Wang, D. Niyato, and P. Ju, “Auction mecha-
nisms toward efficient resource sharing for cloudlets in mobile cloud
computing,” IEEE Trans. Services Comput., vol. 9, no. 6, pp. 895–909,
Nov. 2016.
[35] A. Kiani and N. Ansari, “Toward hierarchical mobile edge computing:
An auction-based profit maximization approach,” IEEE Internet Things
J., vol. 4, no. 6, pp. 2082–2091, Dec. 2017.
[36] Y. Kim, J. Kwak, and S. Chong, “Dual-side optimization for cost-delay
tradeoff in mobile edge computing,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 67,
no. 2, pp. 1765–1781, Feb. 2018.
[37] D. Tse and P. Viswanath, Fundamentals of Wireless Communication.
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[38] A. P. Miettinen and J. K. Nurminen, “Energy efficiency of mobile clients
in cloud computing,” in HotCloud’10 Proceedings of the 2nd USENIX
conference on Hot topics in cloud computing, Boston, MA, USA, 2010,
pp. 1–7.
[39] R. Hassin and M. Haviv, To Queue Or Not to Queue: Equilibrium
Behavior in Queueing Systems. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.
[40] B. A. and E. Sid, “Optimal priority assignment with heterogeneous
waiting costs,” Operations Research, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 107–117, Feb.
1975.
[41] S. Kosta, A. Aucinas, P. Hui, and et al., “Thinkair: Dynamic resource al-
location and parallel execution in the cloud for mobile code offloading,”
in INFOCOM, Orlando, Florida, Mar. 2012, pp. 945–953.
